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Ignored in life, forgotten in death
The nature of agricultural labour suicides
Abstract
Farmers’ suicides in India have mostly been studied in the context of  
identifying the macro variations in the degree of  farmer’s vulnerability 
and the micro level factors causing such differences. Researchers have 
rarely made any attempt to distinguish between agricultural labour and 
cultivators and thus failed to differentiate the processes generating 
suicides by them. Using a village survey, our study examines various 
hitherto unexplored aspects of  vulnerability among cultivators and 
outcome of  agricultural transition; but agricultural labours’ distress arises 
in the process of  transition. During  the transition, major shifts occurs 
from food crops to cash crops and from labour using technologies to 
labour saving technologies causing decrease in the demand for labours. As 
a result, in the event of  crop  failure or price shocks, while some cultivators 
are better able to move out of  agriculture or at least sell their land to 
so because of  lack of  economic opportunities outside agriculture and 
landlessness. Consequently, indebtedness arises of  those who are left 
behind; but for cultivators it is a result of  their decisions going wrong, 
and for agricultural labours it is the process of  transformation that makes 
them indebted and more vulnerable. Therefore, indebtedness might be 
the most important cause of  farmers’ suicides, but the process that led 
to indebtedness varies for cultivators and agricultural labours.
Keywords: Economic transition; Farmers’ suicides India; Distress of  cultivators and 
agricultural labours
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The narrative on farmers’ suicides 
in India has largely identified the 
phenomenon with cultivator suicides. 
The macro studies that have tried to 
identify the states that are most prone 
to farmers’ suicides have tended to 
imply that those affected are cultivators1. 
More localized micro studies appear to 
of  suicides that have been examined 
are largely, if  not entirely, those of  the 
cultivators2. Consequently, much of  the 
discourse on what should be done about 
farmers’ suicides focuses on cultivator 
related issues such as farm prices and 
yield. This narrative has, however, 
National Crime Records Bureau chose 
to present not just the total data for all 
between cultivators (including tenants) 
and agricultural labour. This data that 
is available for 2014 and later years tells 
us that the numbers of  agricultural 
labour committing suicide are far from 
substantially greater than the suicides 
of  cultivators. This makes it imperative 
to ask: Is the process that generates 
agricultural labour suicides the same as 
the one that results in cultivator suicides? 
And if  the two processes are different, 
is it possible that, at least in some 
cases, the policy measures designed to 
reduce suicide-causing distress among 
cultivators could have the opposite effect 
on agricultural labour? 
This paper addresses these questions 
in three parts. First, it points to the 
regional variation in the crisis of  farmers’ 
suicides. This variation occurs both in 
the intensity of  the crisis as well as in 
whether it is cultivator or agricultural 
case of  a village in Palakkad district of  
Kerala in which there has been a spurt 
of  agricultural labour suicides in order 
to gain insights into the socio-economic 
and political processes that generate 
context in which agricultural labour 
pressures on agricultural labour, and the 
resultant suicides. And third, it places 
these insights into the context of  those 
provided by the larger narrative of  
cultivator suicides, allowing us to identity 
the specific processes where policy 
measures designed to reduce cultivator 
suicides can in fact increase pressures on 
agricultural labour.
1 Mishra, 2014;Nagaraj, 2008; Suri , 2006; Patel et al,2012
2 Mishra, 2006;Mohankumar& Sharma,2005;Deshpande,2002;Gill & Singh,2006
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Agricultural labour and 
cultivator suicides
The narrative that has sought 
to paint a macro picture of  farmers’ 
suicides has often presented a state-
wise picture of  the tragedy. Given the 
urgent need to respond to this tragedy, 
and its intensely political nature, much 
of  the discussion around this picture 
has focused on identifying the states 
where this crisis is at its most intense. 
Important as this picture is to capture 
the intensity of  the crisis, it does not 
always adequately capture the extent of  
the variation in farmers’ suicides across 
the country. In an effort to focus on 
this variation one of  the authors of  this 
paper used state-wise data on farmers’ 
suicides over a twenty-year period to 
3. She 
carried out this exercise by normalizing 
the number of  farmers’ suicides in each 
state to the total of  its main workers who 
were cultivators or agricultural labour. 
There have been others who have 
argued that the factor for normalization 
should include marginal workers4.While 
the choice of  the denominator can be 
debated it does not fundamentally alter 
the relative pattern of  the intensity of  
farmers’ suicides across states. This 
is because the states with the higher 
proportion of  marginal workers, such 
as Bihar and Jharkhand, already have 
low rates of  reported farmers’ suicides 
in the calculations based on main 
workers. Adding marginal workers to the 
denominator would only reduce their 
farmers’ suicide rates even further. Since 
the nomenclature of  farmers’ suicides 
also attributes them to an occupation – 
farming – it is important to also ensure 
the rates are not indicative of  a general 
tendency towards suicide in the state. 
This has been fairly widely recognized 
leading to a greater reliance on the 
Suicide Mortality Rate Ratio, or the 
ratio of  farmers’ suicides to the suicide 
rates in the rest of  society5. This ratio 
it captures the rate of  farmers’ suicides 
vis a vis other suicides, as well as the 
frequency with which this was so over 
a 20 year period. This allowed her to 
where the SMRR was > 1 for all 20 
years; Acute, where the SMRR was > 1 
for 10 to 19 years; Less Acute where the 
SMRR was > 1 for5 to 9 years; Prone, 
where the SMRR was > 1 for 1 to 4 
years and Less Prone for states where 
the SMRR was not > 1 for even a single 
3 Banerjee, 2016
4 Basu, Das and Misra 2016
5 Mishra, 2014; Basu, Das and Misra, 2016
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
4
year in the 20 year period. The only state 
chronic was Kerala.
The extent of  the variation is 
however not just confined to the 
intensity of  the crisis. The very processes 
that generate farmers’ suicides can vary 
a great deal, with the pressures of  one 
process contributing to cultivators’ 
suicides even as the pressures of  the 
other are felt on agricultural labour. 
These two patterns have a distinct 
regional spread with agricultural labour 
in some states being more prone to 
suicide than cultivators and the opposite 
being the case in other states. This 
inter-state variation in the tendency of  
different sections of  farmers to commit 
suicides is best captured by comparing 
the rates of  suicides of  agricultural 
labour and cultivators. This is done by 
per every lakh main workers who are 
agricultural labour and the number of  
suicides by every lakh main workers 
who are cultivators. The question of  
normalizing with main workers to all 
workers (main plus marginal) does lend 
itself  to easy answers. It could be argued 
that when we speak of  farmers’ suicides 
we are seeking occupational reasons 
for their extreme action. It would then 
be reasonable to focus our analysis to 
those who spend at least six months 
in a year in that occupation, which is 
workers. At the same time it is not 
entirely clear that the data provided for 
farmers’ suicides by the National Crime 
Records Bureau refers to main workers 
in agriculture alone. It could very well 
include marginal workers in agriculture 
as well. But here again we can’t be 
as marginal workers in agriculture in 
the Census would be considered to be 
farmers in the Crime Records. It is very 
likely for instance that some women 
marginal workers in agriculture who 
commit suicide may simply be recorded 
under the category ‘housewives’ in 
NCRB data. Both the options – of  
going with main workers alone or going 
with both main and marginal workers 
– are thus less than perfect. But since 
we are studying farmers’ suicides we 
may be better served by focusing on 
those who are clearly farmers that is 
the main workers who spend more than 
half  the year on farming activities. We 
difference by taking the ratio of  the 
rates of  agricultural labour suicides to 
the rates of  cultivator suicides. Since 
marginal workers are left out of  both 
the numerator and the denominator at 
least some of  the difference between 
going with main workers or with all 
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workers would be reduced. Since the 
numbers of  the marginal workers who 
are agricultural labour and the marginal 
workers who are cultivators are not the 
same there will be different numbers 
being left out of  the numerator and the 
denominator. But to the extent that the 
tendency towards marginal work tends 
difference can be overcome at the point 
of  interpretation by only focusing on 
states where the ratios are large enough. 
As can be seen from Table 1 there is 
a very substantial variation across states 
in the ratios of  the rates of  agricultural 
labour suicides to cultivator suicides. 
The table calculates this ratio for the 
two-year period 2014-2015, the first 
years for which the NCRB data is given 
separately for agricultural labour and 
cultivators. The data for cultivator main 
workers and agricultural main workers 
are extrapolated from the 2001 and 
2011 Census. The ratios of  the rates of  
agricultural labour suicides to cultivator 
suicides was then calculated in all the 
states in which there were at least 100 
farmers’ suicides during this two year 
period. The ratios vary quite sharply 
from 0.31 in Chhattisgarh to a massive 
683.69 in Rajasthan. The propensity for 
agricultural labour to commit suicide vis 
a vis the same propensity for cultivators 
in a state is greatest in Rajasthan. But this 
conclusion needs to be tempered by its 
context. The magnitude of  this ratio has 
been greatly enhanced by the unusually 
low levels of  cultivator suicides in the 
state. There were just 3 cultivator suicides 
in Rajasthan in the two-year period, 2014-
15. If  we add the fact that cultivators 
accounted for nearly three-fourths of  the 
main workers in agriculture in Rajasthan 
in 2011, the denominator of  the ratio of  
the rate of  agricultural labour to the rate 
of  cultivator suicides would be further 
reduced.6
6 Tabulated from data in Census of  India (India, Chapter 4 i & 4 ii Main Workers and Marginal Workers 2011)
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The Rajasthan story is thus one 
of  pressure on agricultural labour in a 
situation where there is considerably 
less pressure on cultivators. While this 
is an important story in itself  the fact 
that agricultural labour accounts for just 
around a fourth of  the main workers 
in agriculture in the state, suggests that 
very substantial parts of  this sector 
could be less prone to the crisis of  
Table 1: Ratios of  Agricultural Labour to Cultivator Suicides  









labour suicides to 
labour suicide rates 
rates 
Maharashtra 2697 5598 0.48 0.58
Gujarat 799 102 7.83 5.59
Kerala 907 110 8.25 4.4
Assam 92 105 0.88 3.81
412 1297 0.32 0.31
Haryana 239 42 5.69 12.35
Himachal Pradesh 77 32 2.41 23.49
Karnataka 819 1518 0.54 0.77
Madhya Pradesh 1081 1407 0.77 0.64
Tamil Nadu 1431 70 20.44 8.43
Odisha 124 28 4.43 4.15
Punjab 64 124 0.52 0.60
Rajasthan 446 3 148.67 683.69
308 208 1.48 1.83
230 0  NC
Andhra Pradesh 1363 2932 0.46 0.16
Source: Tabulated from data from National Crime Records Bureau and Census of  India, 2011
Notes: 
i. Rates of  suicides of  agricultural labour and cultivators are per one lakh main workers in each 
category as extrapolated from data in Census of  India 2001 and 2011.
ii.  NC refers to ratios not calculated because of  a division by 0 in the case of  West Bengal and 
splitting of  Andhra Pradesh into two states.
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farmers’ suicides. In our search for the 
processes that push agricultural labour 
towards suicide we may be better served 
by focusing on states where this section 
accounts for the majority of  main 
workers in agriculture. This becomes 
quite clear when we map out the ratio 
of  cultivators to agricultural labour 
across districts in the 2011 Census7. As 
geographical contiguity to regions that 
have more cultivators than agricultural 
labour, and vice versa. While in much of  
the country cultivators still outnumber 
agricultural labour among main workers 
in agriculture, there are large contiguous 
regions cutting across states that are 
dominated by agricultural labour. 
7 Bajar, 2017
Figure 1: Distribution of  districts according to the ratio of   
cultivators to agricultural labour
Source: Bajar, 2017
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Our search for an explanation of  
agricultural labour suicides could do with 
insights from regions where agricultural 
labour accounts for a majority of  the main 
workers. The districts where agricultural 
labour outnumbers cultivators (the ratio 
of  cultivators to agricultural labour is 
less than 1) are concentrated in Kerala, 
Tamil Nadu, the old Andhra Pradesh 
(including Telangana) and West Bengal, 
in addition to some districts in other 
states of  central and eastern India. This 
ratios of  suicides as well. Table I tells us 
that all these states also have ratios of  
agricultural labour suicides to cultivators’ 
suicides that are well above 1. These 
states include Kerala that was found to 
have the highest incidence of  suicide. As 
mentioned earlier a paper by one of  the 
authors of  this paper found Kerala to be 
the only state in India which had a greater 
rate of  farmers’ suicides than the rate of  
suicides for others in every year of  the 
twenty-year period 1994 to 2014. There 
is thus a case to take our search for the 
appropriate village to gain insights about 
suicides of  agricultural labour to the state 
of  Kerala. We then conducted a similar 
exercise within Kerala to identify the 
of  the crisis of  farmers’ suicides as 
well as the numerical dominance of  
agricultural labour over cultivators in 
its agriculture. The extent of  the crisis 
of  farmers’ suicides was measured in 
terms of  the number of  years over a 
ten year period (2005 to 2014) in which 
the rate of  farmers’ suicides was greater 
than the rate of  other suicides. The 
numerical dominance was more simply 
agricultural labour among main workers 
in the district in 2011 to the number 
of  cultivators among main workers in 
the district in the same year. As Table 
greater ratio of  agricultural labour to 
cultivators than the other districts. In 
terms of  the extent of  suicides Idukki 
and Malappuram have greater farmers’ 
suicide rates than the rates of  other 
suicides in all ten years studied. Palakkad 
and Kottayam are a close second with 
this criterion being met in nine out of  
the ten years. Taking the two criteria 
together it was decided to look for a 
village characterised by agricultural 
labour suicides in Palakkad district.
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Table 2: District-wise patterns of  farmers’ suicides in  
Kerala for the ten year period 2005-2014















Source:  Kerala State Crime Records Bureau and Census of  India
8 Palakkad District Crime Records Bureau,2015
Palakkad recorded 73 cases of  
farmers’ suicides in 20158, of  which 72 
were agricultural labour and one a farmer 
cultivating leased land. Of  these cases 
39 were reported in a single police circle 
comprising three police stations. More 
than half  these cases, 20 in number, 
were recorded in a single police station 
with give gram panchayats. One of  these 
gram panchayats which had recorded 
chosen for a closer analysis, particularly 
had lived. In this paper we shall refer to 
this village as Thiyoor and all names that 
are mentioned in this narrative have also 
been changed.
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Agricultural labour suicides 
in thiyoor
Thiyoor lies between two state 
highways connecting Kerala to Tamil 
Nadu. With a population of  16500 in 
20119 it easily meets the population 
but it falls well short meeting another 
not meet the condition that more than 75 
percent of  its male main workers should 
be engaged in non-agricultural activities. In 
2011 only 58 percent of  its main workers 
were engaged in non-agricultural activities. 
2018 it retained a prominent place for its 
agriculture even as a number of  other 
activities had begun to mushroom around 
it. There was a considerable amount of  
construction activity on the two highways 
on the peripheries of  Thiyoor. But as 
we moved away from the highway the 
dominance of  agriculture became quite 
evident. On one side of  the agricultural 
fields were the houses of  agricultural 
labour and on the other were the homes 
of  those who owned more land than the 
few cents owned by agricultural labour. 
through a multistage sequential random 
sample through which a questionnaire was 
administered to the heads 203 households 
in two wards. This was followed by 
extended interviews with key persons in 
the socio-economic and socio-political 
sphere of  that village including the 
who commit suicide in 2015 and others 
relatives and friends who knew them.10
The current nature of  agrarian 
processes in Thiyoor has to be seen in 
the historical context of  Palakkad and 
indeed the larger Malabar region. This 
region which was a part of  the Madras 
Presidency in the colonial period had 
a janmi system of  land relations that 
the British could approximate to one 
between landlords and their tenants. 
The powerful landowners who leased 
out land were predominantly Brahmins 
and Nairs. The tenants in Thiyoor were 
predominantly Ezhava as well as some 
among the Scheduled Castes of  Kanakka 
Charma11 and Pananar12 Therewas also a 
class of  agricultural labour belonging to 
the Kanakka Charma and Pananar castes 
as well as among the Muslims. With the 
coming of  the Kerala Land Reforms 
Act in 1969, the Brahmins and the Nairs 
lost their land to their tenants. Most of  
the Brahmins left the village to move to 
urban settings where their higher levels of  
9 Government of  India (GoI). 2011. District census handbook, Census of  India. Ministry of  Home Affairs, New Delhi
10 The survey was conducted by P Shihabudeen.
11
12
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education would be a greater advantage. 
The Nairs too followed a similar path 
with only a handful of  them remaining 
in Thiyoor. The Ezhavasas well the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes who were 
tenants acquired the land they were earlier 
cultivating for the landlords. The amount 
of  land the former tenants received was 
not even, leading to the emergence of  
marginal, small and medium landholdings 
in the post land reform peasant agriculture. 
As was perhaps to be expected not all of  
them did equally well as agriculturists. 
Those that did not do well slipped into 
being agricultural labour, sometimes 
losing their land to other former tenants. 
The urge to sell the land was evidently 
more extensive than the ability of  the 
relatively more successful former tenants 
to buy the land. With the traditional elite 
Brahmin and Nairs alienated from the 
land in the village by land reforms the 
desire to sell their land had to be met from 
outside Thiyoor. The demand was met 
by the trading caste of  Udayars from the 
neighbouring state of  Tamil Nadu. 
The results of  these processes are 
visible in the snapshot of  the agrarian 
wards in the village that emerged from 
the 2017 and 2018surveysand is provided 
in Table 3. The numbers of  the earlier 
dominant castes in the village – the 
Brahmins and the Nairs – had been 
reduced to a point where they could 
only included in the category of  other 
castes who, as a whole, accounted for 
less than 7 percent of  the households. 
In terms of  numbers the agrarian wards 
in the village continued to be dominated 
by Ezhavas – who accounted for nearly 
half  the households – followed by the 
Kanakka Charma who totalled just a little 
less than a quarter of  the households. 
The Udayars with just over 7 percent had 
the same proportion of  the households 
in the village as the Muslims, and the 
Pananars accounted for around 5 percent 
of  the households.
Table 3: Caste-wise distribution of  sample households in Thiyoor
of 
Ezhavas 49.26 0.67 10.33 174.65 121.81
Kanakka Charma 23.65 0.15 4.48 145.45 88.47
Udayar 7.39 4.25 86.65 59.98 72.46
Muslim 7.39 0.06 5.05 38.85 60.52
Pananar 5.42 0.16 3.05 158.23 94.48
Other castes 6.9 -- -- -- --
Source: Village Survey 2017-18. 
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Note: Average land for other castes 
has not been calculated as they included 
opposite ends of  the caste hierarchy 
from Nairs to Scheduled Tribes giving 
the average little analytical value.
The numerical dominance of  the 
Ezhavas does not translate entirely to 
economic dominance. The prominent 
role the Udayars played in buying the land 
being, by far, the most prominent of  the 
land-owning communities in the village. 
The average land owned by an Udayar 
household was as much as 28 times 
the average land owned by a Kanakka 
Charma household. The process of  
differentiation within the poorer castes 
can be seen in the variation in the land 
ownership within these castes. The 
variation in land ownership followed 
by the Pananars  and the Kanakka 
Charma. The variation within a social 
group is least at the two ends of  the 
land distribution – the Muslims with the 
least average land per household and 
the Udayars with the highest land per 
household. This pattern of  variation 
within caste or religious groups is not a 
peculiarity of  land ownership. It extends 
to asset ownership as well. This is evident 
from the variation in the asset indicator 
that was constructed for the agrarian 
wards of  the village. i(Please refer End 
note for details on asset indicators) The 
patterns of  variation within the social 
groups remain exactly the same with the 
of  variation followed by the Pananars, 
Kanakka Charma, Udayars, and the 
Muslims.
This  t ransfor mat ion wi th in 
agriculture has to be seen in the context 
of  a larger transition out of  agriculture. 
The 2011 Census recorded Thiyoor 
as a whole having 53.87 of  its main 
workers in agriculture, in our sample 
from 2017 that number was further 
reduced to 48.71 percent. The Muslims 
have the lowest share of  their workers 
in agriculture at a little less than 30 
percent. This could be attributed to their 
having had traditional non-agricultural 
occupations, particularly in trade. In the 
case of  other communities, interviews in 
the village suggest that a lower share of  
their workers in agriculture is the result, 
at least in part, to a movement out of  
agriculture. The extent to which a caste 
moves out of  agriculture would depend 
on the opportunities available to it 
outside agriculture. The poorer castes of  
Pananars  and Kanakka Charmaappeared 
agriculture with the proportion of  their 
workers in agriculture being above the 
village average. The ability to move out 
apparently improved as we moved up the 
IGNORED IN LIFE, FORGOTTEN IN DEATH
13
hierarchy of  the distance from poverty. 
The proportion of  Ezhava workers in 
agriculture was around the average for 
the village and that of  the Udayars a little 
lower. The landowning upper classes 
such as Nairs, Udayars, Chettiar and 
Muthliyarwere also shifting to private 
employment outside of  the village.The 
exception to this class based trend were 
the Muslims who were not very much 
above the poorest castes in terms of  
their distance from poverty and yet had 
the highest proportion of  their workers 
outside agriculture. But this, as we 
have noted, could be attributed to their 
traditional involvement in trade. 
The hierarchy in the ability to 
in their role within agriculture as well, 
as Table 4 tells us. The ability of  the 
Udayars to move out of  agriculture 
added to their being able to avoid 
agricultural labour altogether. All the 
Udayar workers in agriculture in the 
village were cultivators. Correspondingly 
those who had the least ability to move 
out of  agriculture the Pananars and the 
Kanakka Charma, in terms of  their 
distance from poverty being the lowest, 
also had virtually no cultivators among 
them. All the agricultural workers in the 
Pananar households in our sample were 
agricultural labour and the Kanakka 
Charma did only marginally better with 
negligible number of  cultivators among 
them. The Muslims too had no cultivators 
among them with all their workers in 
agriculture being agricultural labour. 
The Ezhavas did have a greater presence 
among cultivators with 8 percent of  its 
workers belonging to this category, but a 
vast majority of  its workers in agriculture 
were also agricultural labour. 
Table 4: Caste wise Share of  Cultivators and Agricultural Labour in  
Total Workers in Thiyoor
Caste Agricultural Labour Agriculture
Ezhava 8.40 40.08 48.48
Kanakka Charma 1.47 55.15 56.62
Udayar 45.45 0.00 45.45
Muslim 0.00 29.03 29.03
Pananar 0.00 52.63 52.63
All castes 8.82 39.89 48.71
Source: Village Survey 2017-18
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historical evolution of  its socio-economic 
reality. The historical transformation of  
land relations by the land-to-the-tenant 
reforms provided a prominent place for 
the Communist Party of  India Marxist. 
The party continues to dominate the 
political institutions in the village13. The 
opposition to this dominance comes 
from other political parties, such as the 
Congress and the BJP, as well as other 
caste and religion-based organizations. 
Thiyoor has seen the evolution of  
multiple caste associations such as the 
Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana(SNDP) 
of  the Ezhavas. The consolidation 
of  democratic politics in the village 
through panchayat raj institutions has 
strengthened the link between political 
parties and cooperatives. The Service 
Co-operative Bank plays a central role 
in the political economy of  the village14. 
It accepts deposits, lends for agricultural 
and consumption purposes, provides 
of  warehousing facilities, pays out the 
state government’s procurement price 
by the state government to cultivators. 
For example, the Kerala Government 
provides an advance of  Rs. 40,000 to 
cultivators at the beginning of  kharif  and 
rabi cropping seasons. The cultivators 
receive this advance from the cooperative 
bank. Although, there is a nationalised 
bank in the village, the cooperative is 
the most accessed. This dominance 
of  the cooperative is not just because 
of  the higher transaction costs of  the 
nationalized bank but also due to the 
link between cooperatives and political 
parties.
on the cooperative is quite evident 
with the director of  the cooperative 
society being a well-known member 
of  the local political party.15 With 
the villagers directly approaching the 
director for loans, the cooperative has 
become deeply embedded into village 
politics. This is reflected, as Table 5 
tells us, in the patterns of  lending of  
the cooperative bank when compared 
to the other major sources of  lending 
in the village. It would be expected 
that the cooperative banks would focus 
their attention on the poorest so that a 
greater share of  the loans would go to the 
poorer groups. But the compulsions of  
party politics in an electoral democracy 
caste politics in Thiyoor within the larger 
class politics discourse has ensured that 
the Cooperative bank lends to all caste 
13 Village Survey 2017-18
14 Interview by co-operative bank secretary, dated 1th July, 2017
15 Interview dated 16th May 2018
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groups roughly in the proportion to their 
share of  the population. The caste wise 
proportion of  the number of  loans given 
by the Cooperative bank to each caste 
has a striking resemblance to the caste 
wise distribution of  the households in 
the village. Even the Udayars who are 
clearly much richer than other social 
groups in the village have received loans 
from the Cooperative bank roughly in 
proportion to their share of  the village 
population. This pattern is in stark 
contrast to the two other major sources 
institutions and the moneylender. None 
of  the Udayar houses in our sample 
had borrowed from these two sources. 
These two sources also provide a much 
higher share of  their lending to the 
major disadvantaged groups in the 
village. The focus of  microfinance 
institutions is largely on the Kanakka 
Charma, with this caste accounting for 
more than half  the loans provided by 
this source. That is, the share of  the 
Kanakka Charma in the loans provided 
by Microfinance Institutions is more 
than twice their share of  the population. 
This pattern in the distribution of  loans 
can be seen in the distribution of  the 
loans of  moneylenders as well. The 
share of  the Kanakka Charma in the 
loans given by moneylenders is twice 
their share of  the population ad that of  
the Pananars is nearly four times their 
share of  the population. Interestingly 
the moneylender option is closed to the 
Muslims.
Table 5: Patterns of  lending in Thiyoor by source and major caste groups
Caste/
Ezhavas 49.26 10.33 49.01 1.27 28.57 0.67 32.26 0.18
Kanakka Charma 23.65 4.48 23.18 1.31 52.38 0.73 45.16 0.21
Udayar 7.39 86.65 7.28 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Muslim 7.39 5.05 4.64 2.50 4.76 1.00 0.00 0.00
Pananar 5.42 3.05 7.28 1.59 9.52 0.45 19.35 0.38
Source: Village Survey 2017-18. 
Notes: Proportion of  loans is the percentage distribution of  the number of  loans. Average loan 
amount is in Rs lakhs.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
16
Having met the political requirement 
of  catering to all sections of  the village 
the Cooperative bank does tend to 
provide larger loans to the poor. The 
average amount of  the loan is highest, 
at Rs 2.5 lakhs, to the Muslims. The 
average amount then declines roughly 
in inverse relation to the position of  
the caste groups in the indicator of  the 
distance from poverty, with the average 
for Pananars  being Rs 1.59 lakhs, Rs 
1.31 lakhs for the Kanakka Charma 
and Rs 1.27 lakhs for the Ezhavas. The 
average size of  the loans to the richest 
social group in the village, the Udayars, 
is only Rs 43,000. The amounts the 
cooperative banks lend to all castes are 
all castes, and the average lending of  
well above the amount of  the loans 
the moneylender can provide. The 
cooperative bank can then provide the 
poor loans of  a magnitude they cannot 
hope to get from other sources. The 
political nature of  the operation of  
the cooperative bank influences the 
process of  getting loans, bringing in 
the possibility of  the poor getting loans 
they may not reasonably have a chance 
of  repaying. And this factor we will see 
suicides by agricultural labour in the 
village.
Points of pressure on agricultural 
labour
The sharp distinction between the 
pressures on agricultural labour and 
that on cultivators becomes evident 
as we explore the options each has to 
repay loans. Under extreme pressure the 
cultivators have the option of  selling their 
land and joining the larger movement out 
of  agriculture. The sale of  land option is 
very limited as an option for agricultural 
labour. Not only is the land they own 
very small but it is also located in the 
processes of  development around the 
village. The immediate impact on land 
values in Thiyoor has come from the two 
highways that sandwich the village. The 
increased construction activity along the 
highways has had its impact on real estate 
values in their immediate vicinity. But the 
spatial distribution of  land within the 
village works against agricultural labour 
cultivators live in the areas immediately 
beyond the vicinity of  the highways. 
Beyond their residences are large tracts 
of  agricultural lands and beyond that is 
the area where the agricultural labour 
live. The agricultural labour households 
are thus located at some distance from 
the highways, well beyond the circle of  
edge of  the highways. 
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Largely isolated from the real estate 
boom agricultural labour households are 
forced to rely on their daily earning from 
agriculture to repay their loans. At the 
prevailing wage rate of  Rs.400 for men 
and Rs.230 for women the repayment 
of  at least the smaller loans would 
wage rates to translate into meaningful 
income much depends on the availability 
of  employment16. And it is here that 
agricultural labour faces its greatest 
challenge as agriculture in Thiyoor is 
under severe pressure. Paddy, which is 
the predominant crop in the village, is 
highly water intensive. In a good rainfall 
year the Southwest monsoon provides 
the water needed for paddy cultivation 
in the Kharif  season. The paddy crop 
during the Rabi season is dependent 
on the water provided by the canals 
connected to the Parambikulam Dam 
under the Parambikulam-Aliyar project17.
The employment of  agricultural labour 
in Thiyooris very heavily dependent on 
the paddy cultivators getting adequate 
amounts of  water in both seasons. Both 
sources of  water had however come 
under severe pressure at the time of  the 
survey of  the village. The Southwest 
monsoons have not been as assured as in 
earlier times leading to Palakkad district 
being declared drought affected in several 
years leading up to our survey. And canal 
irrigation has been a direct victim of  
an interstate water dispute. The water 
available from the Parambikulam-Aliyar 
Project is dependent on an interstate 
water sharing agreement between Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu. The failure of  the 
negotiations between the two states has 
resulted in the complete drying up of  the 
canals in this project that feed Thiyoor18.
The pressures of  the shortage of  
water have been compounded by the 
changing nature of  agriculture. The use 
of  high yielding varieties of  seeds which 
farmers are convinced require even 
greater use of  fertilizers and pesticides 
have contributed to an increase in the 
costs of  cultivation. At the same time 
the price of  paddy has not shown a 
comparable tendency to rise. Faced 
with a pressure on margins cultivators 
have been turning to mechanization in 
an effort to cut costs. And those who 
still find it difficult have chosen the 
option of  leaving agriculture altogether 
and either selling their land or using 
it for non-agricultural purposes. The 
pressures on agriculture thus learn to a 
decline in the demand for agricultural 
labour at different levels. A failure of  
the monsoons leads to a decline in the 
16 Village Survey 2017-18
17 Parambikulam Dam is an embankment dam on the Parambikulam River. Parambikulam is located in the Palakkad district of  
the Western Ghats of  Kerala, India. The dam is operated and maintained by Tamil Nadu, but the ownership rests with Kerala.
18 Mathrubhumi, 2018
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demand for agricultural labour in the 
Kharif  season, the pressures on the 
canal irrigation system hurt the demand 
for this labour in the Rabi season, the 
rising costs contribute to a tendency to 
leave land fallow for a season or two 
contributing to a further reduction in 
the demand for agricultural labour, and 
the sustained pressures that convince 
cultivators to move out of  agriculture 
reduces the long term demand for 
agricultural labour.
The decline in the availability of  
work in agriculture has resulted in 
agricultural labour seeking work at 
lower wages. Fortunately for them 
Thiyoor has its lower wage rate options. 
Palakkad was one of  the districts in 
which the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes 
(MGNREGS) were begun on a pilot 
basis in 2006, and it continues to provide 
the promised employment guarantee of  
100 days or work per family at a rate that 
similar opportunity is available for women 
under the Kudumashree19 programme. 
It remains a source of  employment. 
But the ceiling on the number of  days 
of  employment that can be provided 
under the MGNREGS, the limits on the 
resources available for Kudumbashree, 
together with the low wage rates ensure 
that these options cannot fully offset the 
reduced employment due to the decline 
in agriculture in Thiyoor. 
The burden of  declining employment 
potential is also felt disproportionately 
across age groups. By its very nature 
workers. The strenuous activities involved 
Given the larger trend of  a relative 
decline in agriculture itself  it is perhaps 
to be expected that the workers in this 
sector would be the older ones who have 
not had the option of  leaving. This is 
true of  both cultivators and agricultural 
labour. But the cultivators are clearly 
able to last longer than the agricultural 
labour. Table 6 below shows that nearly 
80 percent of  cultivators are over the 
age of  45, while this number drops to 
73 percent for agricultural labour. The 
difference becomes even sharper as we 
look at workers over 55 years of  age. 
These workers account for 44 percent 
of  the cultivators but only 31 percent 
of  agricultural labour. What is even 
more strikingly distressing is that once 
agricultural labour cross the age of  55 
they have nowhere else to go. Less than 
1 percent of  non-farm wage workers 
are over 55 and there was no one in our 
sample in this age group who was self-
employed in the non-farm sector. Indeed, 
19 Village Survey 2017-18
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the problem for older agricultural labour 
finding work in other sectors begins 
even earlier with nearly three-fourths of  
the workers in the non-farm sector in 
Thiyoor being 35 years or younger.
A consolidated process of  the 
younger generation finding work 
outside agriculture has its effects on the 
household and the family. The children 
rarely, if  ever, engaged in has brought 
about an occupational diversification 
across generations within the family. 
momentum to the tendency towards 
nuclear families. Most of  the agricultural 
labour households in Thiyoor consist 
of  a relatively older husband and wife 
employed as agricultural labour living 
on their homesteads consisting of  a 
marginal landholding and their house. 
The daughters from these households 
are married to men from the non-
agricultural sector within or outside of  
the village and have traditionally been 
expected to leave the household and 
reduce contact with their parents. The 
traditional expectations from sons being 
different parents typically try to retain 
a stronger relationship, involving more 
frequent contact, with their sons. This is 
an expectation that is often belied.Unlike 
their forefathers, the sons of  agricultural 
labourers are employed agriculture in 
non-farm activities such as construction, 
driving, and small business activities like 
grocery stores outside the village or have 
migrated and settled in the neighbouring 
state of  Tamil Nadu. The married sons of  
cultivator and labour families, across class 
and economic status, live separately from 
their parents either within Kanyachery 
or outside. And among the households 
with cases of  suicide, the sons tend to 
concentrate on their own families and do 
not believe they need to meet obligations 
their fathers have entered into without 
consulting them.  
Table 6: Age distribution of  workers in different occupations in Thiyoor
Age group
0.00 4.17 16.67 35.42 43.75
0.46 11.52 14.75 41.94 31.34
0.00 55.00 30.00 15.00 0.00
0.00 73.95 13.45 11.76 0.84
Source: Village Survey 2017-18
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Responses to pressure
The traditional response of  a 
decline in agriculture would be to share 
the financial burden among its male 
members. The sons would be expected 
crisis brought upon the household by 
agricultural misfortune. And if  loans 
crisis, the sons would share the burden 
of  repayment. But with the sons moving 
out into separate households their 
perception of  their responsibility towards 
repaying the loans of  their fathers 
has considerably diminished, if  not 
disappeared altogether. The burden of  
the agrarian crisis on agricultural labour 
households has then to be borne by the 
head and the remaining members of  
his household, usually his wife. And the 
absence of  work for agricultural labour 
typically affecting both the husband and 
been sought to be met primarily through 
borrowing. The patterns of  borrowing 
of  the cultivator and agricultural labour 
of  both the extent of  crisis as well as the 
priorities of  agricultural labour that have 
emerged in the socio-economic context 
of  an occupational category left behind 
in a society moving out of  agriculture.
Table 7: Average loans of  a 












Source: Village Survey 2017-18
The feature of  the household 
borrowings that strikes us the most is 
that the magnitude of  the loans of  the 
average agricultural labour households. 
Table 7 shows that at Rs 1.4 lakhs the 
average debt of  an agricultural labour 
household is noticeable above that of  
a cultivator household. A significant 
contributor to this difference is the higher 
consumption loans of  the agricultural 
labour households. The data clearly 
confirms what is visible in Thiyoor: 
the burden of  the agrarian crisis has 
hit agricultural labour more than it has 
the cultivators. Agricultural labour is 
also apparently under greater pressure 
for repayment, and has to resort to the 
practice of  borrowing in order to repay 
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other loans. The two other features 
of  the borrowing patterns that are 
borrowing given to house construction 
and to major life events, particularly 
marriages.
The average loans for house 
construction for agricultural labour are 
predictably lower than that of  cultivators. 
With cultivators being relatively better 
off  this is only to be expected. Indeed, 
what is worthy of  attention is that the 
average borrowing of  agricultural labour 
households for house construction is less 
than 20 percent lower than the borrowing 
of  cultivators for the same purpose. This 
would suggest an effort by agricultural 
labour, despite their strained economic 
situation, to try and stay up with the 
cultivators. This tendency would be 
greatest in the castes like the Ezhavas 
where there has been considerable 
differentiation, with some remaining 
cultivators while others were pushed into 
the class of  agricultural labour.
The difference that would demand 
greater attention would be in the amounts 
that are borrowed for marriages. The 
average borrowing of  an agricultural 
labour household for major life events is 
more than three times greater than that of  
a cultivator household. The pressure on 
them to borrow to spend on weddings is 
clearly greater than that on the cultivators. 
There could be a multiplicity of  reasons 
for this pattern. Landowning cultivators 
would be economically better off  and 
would have had greater opportunities 
over the years to save for the weddings 
of  their daughters. They would also have 
a higher status in the village and would be 
under relatively less pressure to use the 
wedding to give the impression of  a higher 
status. Agricultural labour households, 
in contrast, may feel a need to use the 
wedding to present an economic status 
that may be well beyond their means. This 
pressure would increase at a time when 
the economy is moving out of  agriculture 
and parents would like their daughters to 
be married into non-agricultural labour 
families, if  not to men who have moved 
out of  agriculture altogether. The intensity 
the events leading up to the agricultural 
labour suicides in Thiyoor.
Loss of hope
in Thiyoor in 2015 are situated within 
the crisis resulting from the agrarian 
transition in the village. The five 
agricultural labourers who committed 
suicide – who we shall call Mani, Giri, 
Raju, Ramu and Madu20 – were all 
over 55 years old. They lived in small 
20 All the names of  persons have been changed, expect the caste-based title.
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homesteads with their wives who were 
also agricultural labour. The immediate 
consequence was the loss of  work but 
they were also deeply affected by the 
movement of  the younger generation out 
of  agriculture. It is not just that the sons 
were seeking work outside agriculture, but 
the parents also wanted to ensure their 
daughters married outside agricultural 
labour families. None of  the daughters 
married to agricultural labourers, though 
one of  Madu’s daughters is working as 
agricultural labour. 
In all five cases of  those who 
committed suicide the costs of  getting 
their daughters married to men working 
outside agriculture had been quite high. 
All five of  them had spent amounts 
going up to Rs 2.5 lakhs on the dowry 
and other expenses for the marriage of  
their daughters. And it wasn’t just the 
dowry that was needed. They also had 
to make sure they gave the impression 
their families were worthy of  their non-
agricultural labour sons-in-law. A major 
part of  this impression was created 
through the construction of  new houses 
with concrete roofs. The role of  the new 
house became even more significant 
when the sons-in-law were working cities 
and could not afford to immediately 
take their families with them.21 The 
houses had then to be good enough to 
be the home to the children of  someone 
who had a salaried job in the city. This 
pressure could be quite intense. 
Take the case of  the 58-year-old 
Mani22. He was a member of  the Ezhava 
community which, as we have seen, 
later saw considerable differentiation 
in their economic condition. Some in 
this caste were now cultivators and were 
setting the norms for the rest of  the 
community to aspire for. Mani was an 
illiterate agricultural labour and had just 
0.1 acres of  land. His elder daughter was 
married to a man working in a private 
company in Coimbatore. At the time 
of  the wedding he had to spend more 
than two lakh rupees on her dowry in 
the form of  gold and cash. Since the 
costs of  education were too high in 
Combatore the daughter’s two children 
were staying with Mani and going to 
school in Thiyoor. This is likely to have 
strengthened Mani’s resolve to build a 
proper concrete house on his 0.1 acres of  
land, a project that cost him Rs 5 lakhs.
The pressures of  differentiation 
lower down the social hierarchy as well. 
The story of  Ramu23 the 60 year old 
agricultural labour who was a Pannahar 
21 When the families, or at least the grandchildren are left in the village, we get what has been called a collective household that 
is one that has members other than the immediate nuclear family(Pani and Singh 2010).
22 Interview dated 10th July 2017 and May 17th, 2018
23 Interview dated 11th July 2017 and May 17th, 2018
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– a Scheduled Caste – is quite similar to 
that of  Mani. Ramu’s elder daughter too 
is married to a man working in a private 
are living, and studying, in Thiyoor. Ramu 
had even less land than Mani, just 0.05 
of  an acre. But he built a concrete house 
on it. In the process he spent around Rs 
6 lakhs on the marriage of  his daughters 
and the construction of  his house. 
The levels of  expenditure on the 
marriages of  their daughters as well 
as the construction of  their houses 
are well beyond what the agricultural 
labour household could have saved. The 
difference between their savings and 
their socially determined requirements 
necessarily had to be met through loans. 
But this only brought them face to face 
with another gap, the one between their 
low capacity to repay. It is sometimes 
possible in the socially nebulous state 
of  the family to cover this gap by 
distorting ownership patterns. Giri,24 
another Pananar engaged in agricultural 
labour, lived in a house built on 0.1 acre 
of  agricultural land which was inherited 
property that had not yet been divided 
among his siblings. He married his elder 
daughter to a man who had a salaried 
job in the private sector. The cost of  this 
marriage, including the dowry, forced 
him to seek a loan for Rs 2 lakhs from the 
local cooperative bank. In order to get 
the loan he offered as collateral the land 
on which his house was built, handing 
over the documents to the bank. When 
his brothers found out that he had used 
the jointly held property as collateral they 
objected strenuously. Under pressure 
Giri borrowed Rs 75,000 from a local 
moneylender in the hope that if  he 
returned a part of  the amount he had 
borrowed he would get back the family 
documents. But the cooperative bank was 
not willing to return the documents on 
the basis of  a partial repayment, setting 
Giri further into the downward spiral that 
T he  l ack  of  c l a r i t y  in  the 
documentation for Giri’s loan from the 
Cooperative bank points to the fuzziness 
in the process of  evaluating a loan. 
This fuzziness enhances the scope for 
the Director of  the Cooperative bank, 
political leader who refused to help him, 
but on meeting another political leader 
who supported his case, the loan was 
sanctioned within a week. The ability 
of  political parties to influence the 
Cooperative banks makes the sanctioning 
of  loans a critical element of  politics in 
Thiyoor. The need to offer fresh loans 
24 Interview dated June 28th June 2017 and May 16th, 2018
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to their constituents make politicians 
quite sensitive to the ability of  the 
Cooperative Bank to keep generating 
lendable resources. To this end politicians 
are willing to pressurise those who they 
have helped get a loan into meeting their 
repayment schedules to the Cooperative 
voters by offering them loans and then 
pressuring them to repay can be met by 
good-politician-bad-politician actions 
where one member of  the party offers 
the loan and the other steps up the 
pressure to repay. 
This act does not however always 
to the political pressure on him to repay, 
even as a collection agent from a private 
and threatening to destroy his household 
goods, Mani committed suicide. This act 
had an immediate effect on the politics of  
Thiyoor. The Ezhava caste to which Mani 
belonged had divided political loyalties. 
Many remained loyal to the party that 
had decades earlier provided the tenants 
of  this caste land under land reforms. 
At the same time there was a loyalty to 
the social institution of  the Ezhavas, 
the SNDP. With the SNDP beginning 
to actively support non-left parties in 
Ezhavas an alternative to the party of  
land reforms. After Mani’s death, a few 
members of  the SNDP came forward to 
help his wife to repay some of  the loans. 
This led to tension between the old party 
and the SNDP. And Mani’s wife, who 
had previously always voted for the old 
to actively participate in the activities of  
the SNDP and support the parties the 
SNDP supported.
A similar pattern could be seen 
in the case of  Raju, the other Ezhava 
agricultural labour who committed 
suicide. After his death a few members 
of  the SNDP came forward to help his 
wife to repay some of  the loans and 
against the bank and money lenders. This 
led to tensions between the local political 
the SNDP. The family which had been 
actively working for the political party 
before the suicide changed its voting 
pattern after the tragedy. Raju’s wife and 
other members of  the family began to 
actively support the caste association.
Not all caste associations, particularly 
those of  individual Scheduled Castes like 
the Pananars  or the Kanakka Charma, are 
as powerful as the SNDP. In such cases 
the widows have tended to take a less 
direct political role and fall back on Self  
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Help Groups within the larger context 
of  the Kudumbashreeprogramme.25 
In Giri’s case his Pananar caste group 
the ancestral property divided resulting 
in his wife getting ownership of  5 cents 
of  land. She has since then been working 
as agricultural labour and has become an 
active participant in a Self  Help Group. 
In the case of  the other Pananar victim, 
Raju, too the loan was repaid aided by 
the bank converting the old loan to a 
SHG loan, reducingthe interest rate, 
and increasing repayment period. His 
wife is now living alone and she is an 
agricultural labourer and is also working 
in MGNREGA. The family began to 
actively participate in SHG activities. 
This family says it does not participate 
in any political activities because they did 
not get any support from political parties 
when they needed it.
Agricultural labour and 
farmers’ suicides
When analys ing cr ises  of  a 
magnitude and urgency as farmers’ 
suicides there is a temptation to focus 
almost entirely on the factors that are 
seen to be the most important causes 
of  the situation. Such an analysis would 
help us identify individual factors that are 
seen to be the cause should therefore be 
the focus of  our policy attention. In its 
simplest form this would result in asking 
those who were closest to the person 
who has committed suicide what forced 
the extreme act. This is an approach that 
has been followed by the National Crime 
Records Bureau, which has come up with 
the suicides listed by individuals closest 
approach is that the narrative just before 
the suicide would necessarily be focused 
on the issues that are at the forefront at 
such analyses could easily mistake the 
the victims, to be the cause of  the crisis. 
This approach would analyse the crisis in 
terms that the victim has understood it, 
which would typically ignore the larger 
socio-economic trends that are not 
immediately visible to the victim.
In the effort to move beyond the 
perceptions of  the victims there have 
been studies that use econometric 
causes for farmers’ suicides. And most of  
25 Kudumbashree is the poverty eradication and women empowerment programme implemented by the State Poverty Eradication 
Mission (SPEM) of  the Government of  Kerala. The name represents ‘Kudumbashree Mission’ or SPEM as well as the 
Kudumbashree Community Network. Kudumbashree was set up in 1997. Its formation was in the context of  the devolution 
of  powers to the Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) in Kerala, and the Peoples’ Plan Campaign, which attempted to draw up 
the Ninth Plan of  the local governments from below through the PRIs.
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these studies lead to indebtedness being 
the primary cause for farmers’ suicides. 
Studies have found that in Vidarbha 
region of  Maharashtra indebtedness 
contributed the most to farmers’ suicide 
followed by other factors such as, price 
volatility and environmental shocks26. 
It was also found that debt was the 
most common factor in Maharashtra at 
86.5%, followed by deterioration in the 
farmers’ economic status (73.9%)27. A 
comparison of  thefarmers committed 
suicide with those who had not done so 
showed they had three times as much 
studies too have treated the increased 
level of  indebtedness itself  as the major 
cause of  farmer suicides28. 
ranks causes assumes these factors to be 
substantially, if  not entirely, independent 
of  each other. But as we have seen in the 
cases in Kerala this is not quite the case. 
The extent of  indebtedness depends 
on, among other things, the perceived 
needs of  the household, which are in 
including whether the household is one 
of  agricultural labour or cultivators and 
the extent of  the decline in agriculture. 
Indebtedness is then just one of  the 
elements in a larger story that drives a 
cultivator or an agricultural labour to 
suicide. Unpaid debts are typically the 
last stage in a variety of  quite different 
stories that lead to suicide. The pressures 
on a farmer – whether cultivator or 
agricultural labour – to commit suicide 
could be driven by a variety of  factors 
ranging, from the failure of  crops to 
social pressures to get a daughter of  
the family married to someone outside 
agriculture. The fact that in most, if  not 
of  the story does not make it the primary 
cause. Indeed, to treat indebtedness 
as the primary cause is to mistake a 
common factor for the most important 
factor. It is not all that different from 
trying to control farmers’ suicides by 
banning pesticides, on the grounds that 
in a large number of  cases it is these 
chemicals that are used to commit the 
If  we move beyond the search for 
a single dominant cause to the larger 
complexities that lead a farmer to commit 
lead to suicide emerge at different points 
in the entire process. These pressures can 
be seen to be emerging in three different 
stages: the pressures of  larger social, 
26 Dongre and Deshmukh, 2012
27 Mishra, 2006
28 Sidhu and Gill 2006
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economic and political transitions that 
are beyond the control of  the farmer; the 
pressures that emerge from the decisions 
of  the farmers, both on the farm and 
outside; and the pressures that emerge 
from the farmers’ responses to the 
earlier pressures. And in all three stages 
the conditions faced by cultivators and 
agricultural labour could vary.
Among the economic conditions 
that are beyond the control of  the 
farmer considerable attention has been 
paid to the decline in public investment 
in agriculture. This has been seen to 
be affecting, in the main, the extent of  
irrigation. The resultant dependence on 
rainfall for crop growth has contributed 
to the vulnerability that leads to suicides29. 
In some areas of  Vidarbha, one of  the 
worst affected areas of  the crisis, where 
around 85% of  the area is rain-fed, 
making farmers particularly susceptible 
to extreme variations in yields and 
therefore returns30. Farmers who did not 
commit suicide had a higher proportion 
of  their land area that was irrigated than 
suicide victims in Andhra Pradesh31. 
Beyond individual factors like 
irrigation there is a larger trend of  
a sustained decline in the share of  
agriculture in GDP. It has been noted 
that this problem would not be so severe 
if  the share of  workers in agriculture 
saw a corresponding decrease, as the 
earnings of  from individual agricultural 
households would then keep pace with 
the rest of  the economy. But in reality, 
the absolute population dependent on 
agriculture has been growing (Gulati and 
Ganguly 2008). This generates pressure 
on the farming households to move out 
of  agriculture themselves or to at least 
enable their next generation to do so. 
This pressure to move out of  agriculture 
is likely to be felt by both cultivators 
and agricultural labour. But cultivators 
would appear to have greater options 
than agricultural labour, as they are better 
placed to take up ancillary occupations. 
This ability has been shown to be a factor 
in reducing farmers’ suicides. Kale32 
interviewed 200 farmers family with 
cases of  suicide and found 99 percent of  
them did not have any allied occupation. 
He conducted another study in 2014 
again with 200 farmers’ families that had 
experienced farmers’ suicide and found 
that only 1 percent of  the victims were 
has been supported by Nagthan and 
others33 who studied 30 cases of  farmers’ 





33 Nagthan et al., 2011
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87 percent of  victims had ‘‘negligible 
supplementary enterprises”. In control 
group 93.3% observations were having 
access to supplementary employment. 
For agricultural labour the options are 
largely outside agriculture, in areas like 
construction. And the existence of, and 
access to, such alternative occupations 
is well beyond the control of  individual 
agricultural labour households.
The second stage of  the pressures 
on the farmers has some role for their 
decision making. The promise of  higher 
returns encourages them to move from 
food crops to cash crops. The cost of  
production of  food crops tends to be 
lower but the product being sold locally 
does not usually promise very high 
returns. Cash crops have the potentially 
to cater to a global market and hence 
the potential for higher returns, but they 
come with higher costs. The promise of  
higher returns encourages cultivators to 
borrow to shift to cash crops. But the 
promise of  higher returns need not be 
realized. Unexpected weather conditions 
can hurt yields. What are more there are 
the economic reasons for these crops to 
High prices and the corresponding higher 
returns may attract a very large number 
of  farmers to cultivate the crop. This 
could lead to an oversupply in the next 
year, causing a crash in prices. Farmers 
who have borrowed heavily to make 
this shift to cash crops in a year when 
intense pressure, with no viable means of  
repaying the loan. Several studies have 
suicides34.
The impact of  this factor is almost 
exclusively on cultivators, with only an 
indirect effect, if  that, on agricultural 
labour. It is the cultivators who take 
the decision to move from food to cash 
crops and commit their resources to this 
shift. They bear the risk of  a collapse in 
their earnings either due to crop failure 
or due to a collapse in price. Indeed, 
in cases when yields are determined by 
factors such as rainfall in a local area 
and prices are determined nationally or 
even internationally, it is possible for the 
cultivator to face both crop failure and 
price failure simultaneously. The burden 
of  these risks is compounded if  they 
have borrowed more than their ability 
to repay in order to invest in the cash 
crop. The pressure to repay their loans 
is entirely on the cultivator and cane be 
intense enough to push them to suicide.
The effects of  this shift to cash crops 
on agricultural labour are entirely derived 
from the decisions, and fortunes, of  the 
34 Misra, 2006; Kennedy and King, 2014; Mohanty & Shroff, 2004; Mitra & Shroff, 2007
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cultivator. The employment available to 
agricultural labour would depend on the 
extent of  the cultivation of  the cash crop 
and the methods the cultivator chooses 
to use. Much would depend not just on 
how much area is cultivated but also on 
whether the cultivator chooses to use a 
labour substituting or a labour enhancing 
technology. If  they choose a form of  
cultivation that substitutes labour the 
demand for agricultural labour could 
decline even as cultivation increases. 
This could encourage agricultural labour 
to seek longer term options outside 
agriculture, leaving cultivators without 
short-term labour when they need them. 
This encourages a further shift towards 
labour substituting technologies. Once 
the decision to invest in a particular form 
of  cultivation is made, there is no further 
risk for the agricultural labour, with 
the entire risk of  crop or price failure 
lying with the cultivator. The risks for 
agricultural labour then lie at the stage 
of  the cultivator’s decision making, 
outcome. 
The differences in the risks faced 
by agricultural labour and by cultivators 
also have its impact on the nature of  
indebtedness. In analyzing the role of  
indebtedness there has been recognition 
of  the divergence in the outcomes from 
different sources of  loans. It has been 
argued that the diminishing role of  
formal institutions has led to greater 
levels of  borrowing from informal 
sources, thereby increasing suicides35. 
Further exploring the causes for the 
increased reliance on informal debt it was 
found that cultivators who have collateral 
to offer could have an easier access 
to institutional credit than agricultural 
labour, forcing the latter to rely more 
on local money lenders36.This tendency 
becomes even more serious as banks 
may be reluctant to lend to farmers who 
lack irrigation facilities as the return 
they receive on their investment is less 
assured37.
What have not received adequate 
attention is the differences in indebtedness 
that arise from the very different types 
of  risks that are faced by cultivators 
and agricultural labour. For cultivators 
their risks are typically those decisions 
going wrong. The promise of  substantial 
returns could lead them to borrow 
correspondingly large amounts. These 
loans may be well above what they can 
afford to repay in the event of  a crop 
or price failure. The crisis that leads 
individual cultivators to suicide is then 
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For agricultural labour, in contrast, 
the pressure comes from a decline in 
employment opportunities. This results 
in an immediate need for consumption 
loans. The sustained pressure on the 
employment front leads them to seek 
opportunities outside agriculture, if  need 
be by taking additional loans. When the 
decline in employment opportunities 
makes the repayment of  these loans 
towards acts of  desperation, including 
suicide.
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End note
i Calculation of  Distance from Poverty Indicator 
In order to gauge the economic status of  a household this study relied on the assets 
a household owned. The assets chosen in this indicator were based on the expected 
preferences of  rural agrarian household. Since the focus of  the study was on inclusion, 
the effort was to capture the variation at the lower end of  the asset inequality there 
was greater attention paid to assets likely to be owned by the poor. In other words 
what emerged was an indicator of  the distance from poverty. The eleven assets chosen 
for this exercise were: cycle, motorcycle/scooter, car, tractor, tiller, thresher, mobile 
phone, radio/ transistor, refrigerator, cow and color TV. Each of  these assets has been 
asset to the price of  the most expensive asset. For each asset the price taken is that of  
the cheapest new product. For instance, the price of  a car is that of  the cheapest car. 
The highest priced asset among the eleven was the tractor. The price of  the tractor 
was then taken to be equal to 100.  The weights were then calculated for each of  the 
assets as a proportion of  their price to the price of  the tractor times 100. Based on 
this methodology the weights of  the assets were: Cycle= 0.4, motorcycle/ scooter 
=6, car= 30, tiller=3, mobile phone= 0.2, radio/ transistor= 0.14, refrigerator=1.6, 
cow=7, color TV= 1, Thresher = 12
The indicator of  the distance from poverty (DFP) of  a particular household was 
then taken to be (Asset1 Weight x number of  units) + (Asset2 Weight x number of  
units) +…………….(Asset 11 Weight x number of  units)
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